We analyse the experimental outcome of the traveler’s dilemma under three different - baseline (BT), compulsory (CET) and voluntary (VET) ex post players’ meeting)- treatments to evaluate the effects of removal of anonymity (without preplay communication) in a typical one shot game in which there is a dilemma between individual rationality and aggregate outcome.

We test the idea that people with preferences for consumption of relational goods - which we associate with the voluntary decision to meet the other player- are more likely to choose a cooperative strategy in the game. This choice is explained by referring to the subjects’ willingness to rise the value of the relational good which will be consumed with the encounter by creating a positive environment and avoiding a bad disposition in the other player.

The main result of the paper is that the voluntary decision to meet the other player significantly affects the probability to deviate from purely selfish and  rational behavior when it is combined with a high level of generalized trust. By combining behavior with declared values we therefore  extend the literature on social distance by explicitly considering also the role of agents’ social orientation.