In this paper we investigate the effect of perceived motivations on indirect reciprocity. We argue that people show an attitude towards unconditional kindness, while being less prone to reciprocate self-interested cooperation. We call this attitude do-ut-des aversion. The theoretical and experimental efforts on strong reciprocity has up to now focused on the role of intentions in determining the reciprocal response: in this framework the respondent looks beyond the results of the first mver's action, to the availability of feasible alternatives in order to determine the intentionality of the kindness/unkindness of the partner. Different experimental results suggest that this picture may conveniently be enriched by taking into account for the role of motivation behind actions, understood here as an attribute of intentions. The respondent in a gift exchange game is typically intrinsically motivated, since she has no expectations of the kindness of her action being reciprocated. The same doesn't hold for the first mover, both in a direct and in a social indirect reciprocity treatment. An extension of motivational crowding-out  theory to interpersonal settings suggests that the second movers's intrinsic motivation toward reciprocity may be crowded out by self-interested (extrinsic) motives by the first mover. This view leaves room for gratuity and unconditional behaviour to play an important role in determining the quantity, quality and evolution of cooperation in interpersonal relations. Existing tests of the role of motivations in a direct reciprocity setting provide positive evidence. We  here investigate the case of indirect reciprocity. In social indirect reciprocity the first movers gives to a partner and a third player, informed about this choice, responds to the first. We compare a the basic treatment with one in which reputation (extrinsic) motives are ruled out through partial information. In generalized indirect reciprocity the receiver of the first mover reciprocates towards a third player. If the chain si not closed (i.e. the third player is not asked to give to the first) only intrinsic motivation si in charge for triggering reciprocity. We compare a closed chain treatment, in which self-interested motives cannot be ruled out for the first player, with one in which this is the case, thanks again to partial information. We argue that do-ut-des aversion may confer special cooperative features to generalized indirect reciprocity and discuss some interesting applied implications of our theory to corporate social responsibility, to the transfer of corporate ethics and to inter-generation relationships.