Standard economic theories are based on the utilitarian view that people care solely about outcomes; more broadly, they hold that a life-style led in the name of self-interest not only is sufficient to pursue one’s own happiness, but it is also the causal determinant of social welfare. In sharp contrast with that vision, the eudaimonic perspective in economics which traces back to a number of eminent scholars of the philosophic and economic thought (e.g. Aristotle, Genovesi, Sismondi and J.S. Mill) relates happiness to the process of striving toward a goal more than to the passive state of having achieved one, and claims that the real advantage for a society is not to be found in the production and consumption of material goods, but in the enjoyment of engaging and experiencing social relationships. Thus, in this view, sociality and not wealth is the basic element for happiness.

On one side, supporters of both the views rely upon the philosophical concept lying behind them to justify policies for happiness; on the other side, the copious literature on the topic proves both that the issue is particularly vivid, in economics as well as in the philosophic field, although so far none of the two perspectives has succeeded in giving a convincing explanation.

A reasonable answer to the matter can be found in The Joyless Economy (1976) by the economist Tibor Scitovsky (1910-2002) who, by extending the scope of the economic research to the motivational psychology (in particular, the psychological mechanisms producing happiness) first proved scientifically that 1) since we don’t act in order to feel pleasure, but we feel pleasure why we act, it follows that pleasure is not the cause of the action, on the contrary, it is its effect (Scitovsky 1976), 2) the importance of social relations as a basic human need and pleasurable stimulating activities, 3) the societal dimension as the genius loci where to experience them, and 4), given the need for frequent affectively pleasant interactions with other people (Scitovsky 1974; 1976; 1986), they must take place in the context of a temporally stable and enduring framework of affective concern for each other’s welfare, relatedness without frequent contact being unsatisfactory (Scitovsky 1976; Baumeister&Leary 1995; Ryan&Deci 2000; Kahneman et al. 2004).