We study the dynamics of relative consumption within a complex social network. Previous work on the consumption of positional or status goods made the assumption that consumer know either the exact distribution of consumption in society (e.g. Frank 1985, Robson 1992 ) or at least the mean and their relation to it(e.g. Ljunqvist and Uhlig 2000). However consumers are unlikely to have accurate views on these often overestimating their own standing, the so-called above-average-effect (Kruger 1999) Furthermore, as the original formulation of relative income hypothesis by Duessenberry (1949) and common sense tells us, the utility of relative consumption derives from local interactions. We study these local interactions in a social network where each node is a consumer whose consumption and leisure choices depend on that of the nodes with which it shares a connection. With a positional comparison-concave utility over consumption of a good and non-positional preferences for leisure, we show that the allocation of consumption and leisure depends on the Bonacich centrality of an agent in the network. As the ineffcient distortion of leisure increases with centrality of the node, optimal taxation shifts resources from nodes with high centrality to nodes with low centrality.